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Many firms anticipate that a cap on greenhouse gas emissions will eventually be 
imposed, either through an international agreement like the Kyoto protocol or through domestic 
policy, and have started to take voluntary actions to reduce their emissions. If agricultural 
producers participate in the emerging market for tradable C-credits, it must be possible to verify 
that actions farmers take do increase the amount of C in soils and this increase can be maintained 
over the length of the contract.  
In this paper we develop a prototype measurement and monitoring scheme for C-credits 
sequestered in agricultural soils and estimate its costs for the small grain-producing region of 
Montana using an econometric-process simulation model. Three key results emerge from the 
prototype framework. First, the efficiency of measurement and monitoring procedures for 
agricultural soil C sequestration depends on the price of C credits. Second, we find that at all 
price levels, costs of measuring and monitoring are largest in areas that exhibit the greatest 
heterogeneity in carbon values. Third, in a case study application of our prototype measurement 
and monitoring scheme, we find that if we assume similar error and confidence levels as forestry 
contracts, the upper estimate of measurement and monitoring costs associated with a contract 
that pays farmers per tonne of C sequestered is 3% of the value of a C-credit. This cost is small 
relative to the estimated net value of the contract. Thus we conclude that measurement and 
monitoring costs are not likely to be large enough to prevent producers from participating in a 
market for tradable credits.    
 
Contracting for Soil Carbon Credits: Design and Costs 
of Measurement and Monitoring 
 
 
Introduction and rationale 
Many industrialized counties are considering ways to reduce their net emissions of 
greenhouse gases (GHG), such as carbon dioxide, that potentially contribute to global warming 
(Watson et al. 1996). The Kyoto protocol of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change is part of an ongoing international discussion that aims to identify means of 
reducing GHG (UNFCCC 1998). One proposal is a C (carbon) credit-trading scheme that would 
allow participating countries to receive credits for domestic or international projects that reduce 
emissions beyond a “business as usual” case. In 2001, the Bush administration announced that it 
would not sign the Kyoto protocol but in February 2002 announced a global climate change 
initiative that proposed to include forest and agricultural soil C sequestration in U.S. 
conservation programs and to develop accounting rules for sequestration projects (White House 
2002). While the Bush climate change initiative is voluntary, the document acknowledged that 
limits on greenhouse gas emissions are an option to achieve future reductions. Many firms 
anticipate that a cap on greenhouse gas emissions will eventually be imposed, either through an 
international agreement like the Kyoto protocol or through domestic policy, and have started to 
take voluntary actions to reduce their emissions (Rosenzweig et al. 2002).  
Since 1996, approximately 65 credit trades have occurred worldwide and since 1995 over 
150 projects have been implemented to reduce C emissions or increase C sequestration 
(Rosenzweig et al. 2002). Approximately 10% of these projects increase C sequestration using 
forestry activities (Watson et al. 2000; Rosenzweig et al. 2002). Recent research suggests that 
agriculture could also contribute to GHG reductions. U.S. emissions could be reduced by up to    
 
8% by increasing C sequestered in agricultural soils (Lal et al. 1998) and these credits could be 
purchased at prices competitive with forest carbon (Antle et al. 2002a). Although C-credit trades 
are occurring, institutions, contracts, enforcement mechanisms and policies have not been 
standardized. These elements will influence the costs of supplying and purchasing soil C.  
If agricultural producers participate in the emerging market for tradable C-credits, it must 
be possible to verify that actions farmers take do increase the amount of C in soils and this 
increase can be maintained over the length of the contract. This study is motivated by the fact 
that C stored in agricultural soils cannot be observed or measured directly in the same way that 
point-source industrial emissions or creation of above ground biomass in forests. Several 
scientists and policy makers have questioned whether it will be feasible to include agricultural 
soil C sequestration in either government programs to sequester C or in a market for tradable C-
credits.  
In this paper we develop a prototype measurement and monitoring scheme for C-credits 
sequestered in agricultural soils. Three key results emerge from the prototype framework. First, 
the efficiency of measurement and monitoring procedures for agricultural soil C sequestration 
depends on the price of C credits. This result follows from the fact that, farmer participation in 
contracts to sequester soil C depends on both economic and biophysical conditions. Given 
typical farm sizes and rates of C sequestration in agricultural soils, a relatively large number of 
farmers are needed to sequester enough C to create a commercially traded C contract. In this 
respect, measurement and monitoring for agricultural soil C sequestration differs importantly 
from procedures that have been developed for contracts between one or a few buyers and single 
sellers of C sequestered in large forested areas. Second, we find that at all price levels, costs of 
measuring and monitoring are largest in areas that exhibit the greatest heterogeneity in carbon    
 
values. Third, in a case study application of our prototype measurement and monitoring scheme, 
we find that if we assume similar error and confidence levels as forestry contracts, the upper 
estimate of measurement and monitoring costs associated with a contract that pays farmers per 
tonne of C sequestered is 3% of the value of a C-credit. This cost is small relative to the 
estimated net value of the contract. Thus we conclude that measurement and monitoring costs are 
not likely to be large enough to prevent producers from participating in a market for tradable 
credits. 
 
Generating credits by sequestering carbon 
Industries can directly lessen GHG emissions by reducing fossil fuel combustion. In 
many cases this requires firms to develop and adopt new technologies or change existing 
production methods prior to planned replacement and could be very costly. Another alternative is 
to purchase C credits from a less expensive source until a time where it is not as costly to bring 
new technologies on line. At COP 7 – Marrakech, 2001, international discussions indicated that 
agriculture and forest sinks could be recognized as a source of C credits (UNFCCC 2002). If 
agriculture and forestry generate credits at lower cost than other sources or technological change, 
these industries will be strong participants in the market. 
Forestry and agriculture generate credits in roughly the same way. During 
photosynthesis, plants take CO2 from the atmosphere and convert it to C in their above ground 
biomass and below ground root systems. In forest ecosystems approximately 80% of C is stored 
in woody biomass represented by trees and 20% in the below ground root and soil system 
(Watson et al. 2000). In agricultural systems, the annual nature of most crops means that a small 
amount of C is stored in biomass (later harvested and taken from the field) but over time C can    
 
be sequestered in cropland soils. When land is converted from native vegetation to modern 
agriculture, C stored within the soil is released into the atmosphere through oxidation; and in 
some cases, above ground biomass production decreases, reducing inputs of C into the soil 
(Watson et al., 1996; Lal et al., 1998). Tiessen et al. (1982), Mann (1986), and Rasmussen and 
Parton (1994), estimate that 20% to 50% of soil C is lost during the initial 20 to 50 years of 
cultivation. Because of this past depletion of soil C levels, cultivated soils in many areas have the 
capacity to store more C than they do at present (Lal et al., 1998).  
 
Design of projects to create carbon credits 
Although trading rules are not finalized, private companies and non-profit groups are 
engaging in pilot projects that generate C credits. For example, the energy company, PacifiCorp 
has invested in forest preservation in Bolivia as well as tree planting projects in Oregon that 
sequester C (PacifiCorp 1997). The Nature Conservancy and Winrock International are also 
involved in many activities in South and Central America that generate C credits from forest 
activities. Several projects are described in Watson et al. (2000). There are several incentives for 
buyers to purchase C-credits voluntarily in the absence of a formal US market; for example, 
gaining early mover advantage in a developing market by amassing experience with early trades, 
or informing the policy debate. C-credit sellers also participate for similar reasons as well as the 
opportunity to market a new commodity that previously had no value. 
C-credits can be expressed either as representing the reduction of one unit of C from the 
atmosphere or a unit of CO2. In this paper a C-credit represents one tonne (1,000 Kg) of C. Most 
trades to date are denominated in tonnes CO2 (Rosenzweig et al. 2002). A tonne of C removed 
from the atmosphere is equivalent to 3.7 tonnes of CO2. Currently, the market for C-credits is    
 
thin and trades rely on simple legal and financial arrangements. At a minimum, projects that 
generate certified credits involve one buyer and one seller in addition to some form of 
measurement, monitoring and certification. Certification is important if credits are intended to be 
tradable commodities in the marketplace at a future date. Buyers have either purchased property 
outright and then established a project that generates credits, or purchased rights to C-credits on a 
property over the project lifetime (see projects described in Watson et al. 2000 and PacifiCorp 
1997).  
To conform to Articles 3.3 and 3.4 of the Kyoto protocol, projects must meet the 
standards of additionality, permanence, duration and leakage (UNFCCC 1998; Watson et al. 
2000). Additionality, means that credits generated must be additional to any changes in C that 
would have occurred under a “business as usual” scenario. Permanence refers to the length of 
time that C is sequestered and maintained in a sink such as a forest or agricultural soil. Duration 
refers to the length of the contract. Leakage concerns the issue of project activities causing 
economic agents to take actions that would increase GHG emissions elsewhere. An additional 
concern for soil C sequestration is saturation; soil C can be accumulated over time only until 
some maximum amount of C per volume of soil is reached.  
Several guides have been developed for measuring and monitoring carbon within forestry 
and agroforestry projects (MacDicken 1997; Vine, Sathaye and Makundi 1999; Brown 1999). 
Although C is sequestered in forest soils these guides concentrate on measuring and monitoring 
above ground C stored in woody biomass. Contracts for forest C-credits have involved a single 
seller with large carbon quantities and multiple buyers (for examples see, Watson et al. 2000) or 
multiple sellers with a single buyer (ENN 2001).     
 
Contracts for C-credits generated from agricultural practices are likely to share many 
common elements with those used in forestry. However based on sample trades to date, contracts 
for C-credits are expected to be larger than 273 tonnes C (1,000 tonnes CO2) an amount too large 
for a single agricultural producer to fill in most situations (Rosenzweig et al. 2002). For example 
consider a contract for 300 C-credits between a buyer and a group of farmers. Research indicates 
that under most conditions C can be sequestered in agricultural soils at rates less than 1 
tonne/ha/yr over a period of approximately 20 years (Watson et al. 2000). Assuming: a rate of 
0.5 tonnes/ha/yr for 20 years; and that a typical farm commits 100 hectares, then six farms would 
be required per contract. In practice many trades have involved quantities significantly larger 
than 300 tonnes C (Rosenzweig et al. 2002) thus we can expect that contracts for agricultural C-
credits are likely to be characterized by individual buyers contracting with many sellers or an 
intermediary that pools credits from many sellers. Measurement and monitoring schemes that are 
suitable for these arrangements need to be developed for soil C.  
 
Contracting for agricultural soil carbon credits 
There are two cost components associated with supplying C-credits. First the opportunity 
cost of sequestering C and second the costs associated with enforcing contracts and monitoring 
the quantity of C-credits. The opportunity cost is influenced by the design of incentives provided 
to producers to sequester soil C. Several studies have demonstrated that per-tonne contracts 
result in the production of a given number of C-credits at a lower opportunity cost than per-
hectare contracts (Antle and Mooney 2002; Antle et al. 2002b; Pautsch et al. 2001) because 
payments are directly linked to the number of credits produced. However, very little work has 
examined the related costs of monitoring and enforcing each contract.     
 
Under a per-hectare contract design, producers are paid for each hectare of land that they 
convert to a management practice thought to sequester additional carbon. Payments are based on 
the number of hectares that are converted to a recommended practice, rather than the quantity of 
carbon accumulated. This design is very similar to existing government programs for agriculture 
such as the conservation reserve program and is most likely to be used for government programs 
where the actual amount of carbon stored does not need to be determined, (or at least not to a 
high degree of accuracy). The measuring and monitoring requirements of such a program are 
minimal and extend to ensuring that producers are engaged in a recommended production 
practice. Although government programs have not included detailed measurement and 
monitoring systems in the past this is no guarantee that they will not in the future.  
Under a per-tonne contract design, each hectare of land entering the program receives a 
different payment corresponding to the number of C-credits created on that hectare. In contrast to 
per-hectare contracts, the number of C-credits created is an important part of per-tonne contracts 
and needs to be measured to ensure that suppliers have met the terms of the contract. Per-tonne 
contracts are suited to a market for C where payments are made for each C-credit created and 
stored over the duration of the contract. Ideally, producers would receive payments for C 
sequestered using an unlimited range of practices. However measurement and certification would 
be simplified if only a subset of the most likely best management practices were considered as 
eligible for payments related to C-credits. Then monitoring resources can be focused on, and 
developed for, the most productive practices. 
Economic logic suggests that profit-maximizing producers will enter into contracts to 
sequester C in soil when the benefits of the contracts outweigh the costs. Ignoring for the 
moment any transactions costs, consider a contract for T periods that pays a producer g dollars    
 
per time period for each hectare that is entered into a contract (a per-hectare contract) intended to 
increase soil C. In order to increase soil C, the producer must change land use and/or other 
management practices from the initial system i to some subsequent alternative system s. For the 
producer to switch management practices, the present value of system s plus the present value of 
government payments g must be greater than the present value of system i. Letting D be the 
present value of 1 at interest rate r for T periods, and letting pi be the annual returns to the ith 
system, the present value of expected returns for the ith system is Vi =  piD(r,T) and the present 
value of expected returns from system s is Vs=psD(r,T). The present value of a payment of g 
dollars per hectare each year is G = gD(r,T). Thus the producer will switch from system i to 
system s for T years if Vi < Vs + G, which implies pi < ps + g or (pi - ps) < g each period. Thus 
we can conclude, as expected, that a producer will agree to switch to practice s if the opportunity 
cost per hectare of changing practices, (pi - ps), is less than the payment per hectare g, otherwise 
the producer will continue to use practice i. 
A market for tradable emissions credits would effectively offer producers a payment for 
each tonne of sequestered soil C (a per-tonne contract). The producer is offered a price, P ($ per 
tonne of C), if the producer can switch from production system i to system s and produce an 
additional ∆Cis tonnes of C per hectare, the payment per hectare to the producer will be P∆Cis. 
Following the logic of the previous paragraph, the producer will benefit from the contract if and 
only if pi < ps + P∆Cis or if (pi - ps)/∆Cis < P, that is, if and only if the opportunity cost per tonne 
is less than or equal to the price per tonne. The greater economic efficiency of the per-tonne 
contract follows from the fact that it provides the incentive for soil C to be sequestered up to the 
point where the marginal cost per tonne equals the market price per tonne, whereas the per-   
 
hectare contract provides an incentive to change practices regardless of how much soil C is 
accumulated. 
Figure 1 outlines some transactions costs associated with implementing per hectare and 
per tonne contracts for soil C. Both contract types are likely to incur costs associated with 
negotiating contracts and verifying that producers are maintaining practices that generate C-
credits and store these credits for a specified duration. Identification and negotiation costs can be 
thought of as occurring prior to final agreements to enter a contract and are common to both 
contract designs. Costs associated with measuring and monitoring C-credits occur once the 
contracts to participate have been finalized. These costs are generated by two main activities: 
first, ensuring that producers are engaged in practices eligible for a payment and second, 
measuring and monitoring the number of C-credits. 
Under typical per-hectare contracts, such as those used for agricultural conservation 
programs in the US, practices eligible for payments are specified in the contract but the quantity 
of environmental benefit such as the amount of soil erosion prevented is not. Thus in a per-
hectare contract for soil C sequestration we would expect practices to be specified but not the 
amount of soil C sequestered and it may not be necessary to monitor the number of credits 
produced. However as stated earlier, the quantity of C-credits is the key factor under a per-tonne 
contract. While economists have established that a per-tonne contract results in production of soil 
C credits more efficiently than a per-hectare contract it is unclear whether the additional costs 
associated with measuring and monitoring C-credits will offset these efficiency gains. The 
difference between the opportunity cost of supplying a given quantity of C-credits under a per-
tonne contract versus a per-hectare contract provides an upper bound on the additional costs that 
can be incurred in measurement, monitoring, verification and certification of credits under per-   
 
tonne contracts (Pautsch et al. 2001; Antle et al. 2002b). The additional costs of measuring and 
monitoring carbon credits produced by any project need to be considered with the opportunity 
cost of producing carbon under each contract design to evaluate which is the most efficient for 
credit trades (Moxey, White and Ozanne 1999). Stavins (1998, 1999) suggests that the costs of 
measurement and monitoring required to implement per-tonne contracts for forestry could be 
prohibitively expensive. 
 
Design of a measurement and monitoring scheme for agricultural C credits 
Following figure 1 measurement and monitoring costs (M) associated with contracts for C 
credits can be decomposed into two parts: ensuring that participants are engaged in activities 
eligible for payments and verifying the quantity of carbon that has been sequestered. Both per-
hectare and per-tonne contracts need to verify that producers are engaged in practices that are 
eligible for a payment under the terms of their contracts. This could be accomplished through 
remote sensing, aerial photography or drive by inspection. The second cost component comes 
from measuring and monitoring the number of C-credits produced over a given area. One means 
of estimating the quantity of C-credits produced by a group of producers is statistical sampling. 
Measurement and monitoring costs (M) are expressed in dollars as 
) F , CN , ( S AV M sc z z n + =       ( 1 )  
where: 
z = per-tonne contract, per-hectare contract 
sc= random sampling, stratified random sampling, systematic sampling, or other sampling 
scheme. 
AV = cost of verifying producers are complying with practices specified in the contract ($)    
 
S = Cost of implementing a sampling protocol ($) 
nsc = number of samples for a given sample scheme, sc. 
CN = cost per sample ($) 
F= frequency of sampling 
















In the event that both contracts are offered within an area they would attract different sets 
of participants (Antle and Mooney 2002; Antle et al. 2002b). However this may not necessarily 
result in substantial differences in the costs of large scale monitoring practices (AV)
1 especially 
when this can be done using remote sensing or similar techniques. Under a per-hectare contract, 
payments are independent of the number of credits generated, thus there is no need to verify their 
quantity hence 0 ) , , ( = − F CN N S sc hectare per , whereas under a per–tonne contract the number of 
credits created is specified in the contract hence  0 ) , , ( > − F CN N S sc tonne per . Therefore the 
additional measurement and monitoring costs under a per-tonne contract are attributable to the 
costs of statistical sampling under this scheme. 
Because C-credits for a single contract are likely to be supplied from several producers 
covering a large area, we propose a combination of field measurements and predictive models to 
estimate changes in carbon quantities. The prototype measuring and monitoring scheme we 
propose for per-tonne contracts contains the following elements: 
                                                 
1 Changes in fertilizer, tillage and other management practices will be more difficult to verify than changes in 
cropping systems. This creates a potential problem of asymmetric information between farmers, who have complete 
knowledge of their practices, and the buyers of soil C credits, who cannot readily observe farmer practices (Wu and 
Babcock 1996).    
 
a.  Use predictive biophysical models to estimate the expected rate of soil carbon 
sequestration, resulting from changes in management practices within the contract 
area, taking into account specific climatic and soil conditions. 
b.  Measure baseline levels of carbon within a contract area using statistical sampling 
techniques and laboratory testing. 
c.  Monitor increases in carbon over the duration of the contract by periodic field 
samples and laboratory testing. 
d.  Measure increase in carbon levels at the end of the contract.  
Several sampling designs can be used to select a sample from a population including 
simple random, stratified and cluster sampling (Thompson 1992). Stratified random sampling 
has been used to measure and monitor carbon sequestration in forest projects (Boscolo et al. 
2000; Brown et al. 2000) and is also suitable for estimating soil carbon sequestered within 
cropping systems. An advantage of this design is that stratification reduces the sampling error 
and can reduce the sample size necessary to estimate population parameters, and thus the costs 
associated with measuring and monitoring C-credits (Thompson 1992; McCall 1982).  
Using a stratified sampling approach, the population is defined as those producers that 
have agreed to enter into a contract to supply C-credits. The population can be divided into 
heterogeneous groups or strata that are internally homogeneous with respect to a chosen 
characteristic, and then sampled independently using a random sampling design. Within a given 
area covered by a contract, the population to be sampled is all hectares of cropland that switch 
from a historical cropping system to a new system that sequesters additional carbon as a result 
of a payment offered per C-credit. The population within each stratum is homogeneous with    
 
respect to a cropping system change. The unit of analysis is an individual “field” of one hectare 
in size.  
Population size is a function of the biophysical, technological, policy and economic 
parameters facing each producer including the payment level or price offered per credit (Antle 
and Mooney 2002, Antle et al. 2001a). When the price offered for C-credits is low, only those 
hectares with the lowest opportunity costs of producing credits will enter into contracts. As the 
price offered per credit increases, it is profitable for a larger number of hectares to enter contracts 
for C-credits. Therefore we expect that the population to be sampled will increase as the price 
offered per credit increases. There is some price that is high enough for every hectare within an 
area to switch practices and supply C credits; after this point the population to be sampled would 
remain constant for any further price increases.  
The total sample size, n, required to estimate the mean number of C-credits supplied by 
each hectare within a population can be calculated using (2) (McCall 1982) and distributed 
among the strata using one of several different schemes (for examples, see Thompson 1992; 























        ( 2 )  
where: 
n  = total sample size 
Z  = value from standard normal table corresponding to desired level of confidence 
in parameter estimate 
N  = total number of hectares in the population    
 
j  = index identifying strata where j = 1,……, J 
Nj   = total number of hectares in the jth stratum 
j σ ~   = initial estimate of the standard deviation of change in carbon over 20 years 
resulting from a crop system change in the jth stratum 
ε   = absolute error permitted for the statistic used as an estimate of the population 
parameter 
 
An important implication of (2) is that an increase in the spatial heterogeneity of C-credit 
production (represented by larger values of 
j σ ~ ), holding Z, ε , N, and Nj constant, will increase 
the total sample size needed to estimate the change in C credits. Thus, all other things equal, 
measuring and monitoring will be more costly in areas that exhibit the greatest spatial 
heterogeneity, because these areas will require larger sample sizes.  
In general we would expect spatial heterogeneity to increase as the area sampled 
increases in size. The degree of spatial heterogeneity exhibited by a population electing to supply 
soil C-credits within a given area will be influenced in part by the relative location of each 
individual within the area. For example, soil C is likely to exhibit less heterogeneity when the 
hectares supplying C are clustered together. Conversely if the analysis units are scattered 
spatially, the degree of heterogeneity in soil C rates could increase. The location of each hectare 
within the population supplying C-credits at any given price level is unknown before contract 
agreements are signed and will vary as the price of C-credits change.  
Under the measurement and monitoring protocol proposed in this paper an estimate of the 
expected variability of soil C sequestration resulting from crop system changes is calculated 
using the C sequestration potential of each major soil type within each agroecozone (described    
 
later). Thus a single estimate of the variability of C sequestration is associated with each 
cropping system change and  j σ ~  is held constant at each payment level for soil C. When Z,ε  and 







, increases, the influence on sample size, n, 
and the costs of measuring and monitoring, M, is indeterminate. If the denominator in (2) 
increases more than the numerator n will decrease as the payments for C-credits increase, 
whereas if the denominator does not increase as fast as the numerator, n will decrease. 
The sampling scheme described above does not assume that changes in C sequestration 
are spatially autocorrelated. In the event that spatial autocorrelation is present, the sample size 
could be reduced (or some scheme adopted to ensure samples are further apart) because 
individual observations will contain information about their neighbors.  
In the field soil samples are taken using specialized probes
2, then bagged and transported 
to a laboratory to be air-dried, ground and measurements taken of total carbon. The cost per 
sample (CN) can be calculated from (3).  
CN = ((L + R + FC)/ND) + LC              (3) 
where: 
  CN  = cost per sample ($) 
  L  = total labor costs per day ($) 
  R  = daily rental cost of truck and Giddings probe ($) 
  FC  = fuel consumption per day ($) 
  ND  = number of completed field samples per day 
  LC  = laboratory cost of preparation and analysis of single sample ($) 
                                                 
2 For example a Giddings probe.    
 
The frequency of sampling activities, F, will be influenced by the duration of the project 
and the rate of C accumulation. Measurements to establish changes in soil carbon may not need 
to be conducted annually because carbon levels do not change dramatically from year to year 
(assuming no disturbance). Vine and Sathaye (1997) and Vine, Sathaye and Makundi (1999) 
suggest visual inspection annually to determine whether soils have been disturbed in forest 
projects, and if no disturbance has taken place measure/monitor every five years. McConkey and 
Lindwall (1999) suggest measuring soil carbon every three years on fields converted to no-till. 
Brown et al. (2000) plan to measure carbon sequestered within a 30-year forest project in years 
3, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25 and 30. At a minimum, F=2, reflecting the need to establish baseline levels of 
carbon at the beginning of the project and final carbon levels at its conclusion. 
 
Model description and data 
The framework developed above was used to estimate the costs of measuring and 
monitoring soil C credits under a per-tonne contract for soil C sequestration in the small grain-
producing region of Montana. Producers’ responses to payments offered for C-credits under a 
per-tonne contract were simulated using an econometric-process model. Hectares that switch 
management practices to supply C credits at a given price per tonne of C are the population to be 
sampled. The amount of C sequestered on a hectare in response to each production system 
change is estimated by agroecozone using Century, a crop-ecosystem model designed to study 
soil C dynamics. Antle et al. (2001a) present the estimates in detail. These estimates are used 
within the econometric-process simulation model to estimate the value of C payments for each 
hectare and the total quantity of C sequestered within a given agroecozone. 
Site-specific field scale data are used to estimate production models of output supply and 
input demand. The parameter estimates obtained from these econometric models are then used to    
 
drive a simulation model that represents producers’ decision-making processes as a sequence of 
discrete land use and continuous input use decisions at the field level. The model assumes that 
producers are price takers in input and output markets. 
Within agroecozone m, let δ k
i = 1 if system i is used on field k and let δ k
i = 0 otherwise, 
define δk= Σi δk
i, and let πk
n be the returns to a non-crop land use on field k and πk
i be the returns 
to cropping system i on field k. The econometric-process simulation model is based on the 











i) + (1-δk) πk
n. 
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i…δk
I               ( 4 )  
 
Under a per tonne contract that pays producers for each C-credit produced, in agroecozone m the 




is is the increase in carbon accumulation resulting from switching a hectare from 
system i to system s in the m




i  then the producer will switch from crop system i to crop system s and sequester 
∆cm
is tonnes of C. Detailed descriptions of the model and estimation procedures can be found in 
Antle and Capalbo (2001b), Antle et al. (2001a) and Antle et al. (2002b). Site-specific 
management and input data are available from a detailed survey of fields on 425 farms in the 
dryland-cropping region of Montana (Antle et al. 2001a). 
   Century is a generalized biogeochemical ecosystem model that simulates C, nitrogen and 
other nutrient dynamics (see Parton et al. 1994; Paustian et al. 1996; Paustian, Elliott, and Hahn 
1999). The model runs on a monthly time step and is driven by monthly precipitation and 
temperature, soil physical properties (e.g. texture, soil depth) and atmospheric nitrogen inputs in    
 
addition to site-specific management information. Soils and climate data were collected for 3 
MLRAs within Montana. A MLRA (major land resource area) reflects an area that has relatively 
homogeneous climatic and growing conditions. To provide better spatial resolution of 
biophysical conditions for this study, each MLRA was further subdivided on the basis of 
historical precipitation into high and low rainfall areas, totaling 6 sub-MLRAs (figure 2). 
Century was used to calculate average C rates for common cropping systems within each sub-
MLRA. The simulations showed that most of the C accumulation occurred over a 20-year period 
after a change in management. Seven cropping systems were considered, spring wheat-fallow, 
barley-fallow, winter wheat-fallow, grass and spring wheat, barley and winter wheat-continuous 
cropping systems. Century results show C-credits can be generated by increasing the intensity of 
crop production and changing from crop-fallow to grass and continuous cropping systems (Antle 
et al. 2001a). 
 
Empirical application 
The econometric production simulation model is run assuming payment levels for C-
credits that increase in $10 increments between $10 and $100. At each payment level, the model 
calculates the number of hectares that switch production practices (the population to be sampled) 
and the number of C-credits produced within each sub-MLRA. Information generated from the 
econometric production simulation model and the Century ecosystem model is used to estimate 
the sample size necessary for measurement and monitoring activities within each agroecozone. 
The cost per sample is estimated according to (3) and specific assumptions are described below. 
    
 
Determining sample size ‘n’ for each agroecozone 
Within a given agroecozone (sub-MLRA), the population can be stratified on the basis of 
cropping system changes that are relatively homogeneous with respect to their ability to generate 
C-credits. For example, fields that switch from a spring wheat-fallow system to a continuous-
spring wheat system form one strata while those fields that switch from a barley-fallow system to 
continuous-spring wheat would be another strata. In total, the model includes ten possible 
cropping system changes that produce C-credits; thus each agroecozone can have a maximum of 
ten strata. The number of hectares within any payment scheme (the population of interest) is 
calculated by the model and is known and finite. As the payment level offered for each C credit 
increases, production practices will change on a larger number of hectares. This means that as 
the price per C-credit increases a different number of hectares will join the scheme and the size 
of the population and the cost of sampling per C credit will change. Unlike sampling from an 
infinite population, changes in the population size will change the size of the sample required to 
estimate its parameters. At different market prices for C-credits N and Nj are estimated using the 
econometric process simulation model while 
j σ ~  is calculated from inputs into the Century 
model. A summary of the data required to estimate sample size are presented in table 1. 
 
Determining the cost per sample ‘CN’ 
 
Discussions with practitioners in the field resulted in the following assumptions used to 
determine the cost per sample: soil samples are taken using a Giddings probe mounted on a ¾ 
ton truck; two operators are employed to obtain the samples, and 50 samples are collected per 
day. Once the field samples are collected we assume they are taken to a laboratory for further 
processing. Using table 2, the cost for a single field sample is estimated at $16.37. This figure is    
 
similar in magnitude to Smith (2002) who reports a cost of approximately $25 per sample for a 
project in eastern Oregon. A detailed breakdown of assumptions, data sources and costs are 
presented in table 2.  
 
Frequency of measurement ‘F’ 
We assume that over the 20 year project lifetime each area is sampled four times, first to 
establish baseline C estimates, twice more for monitoring in years 5 and 10 and finally at the 
conclusion of the contract in year 20. Therefore F = 4, in the calculation of measurement and 
monitoring costs. 
 
Measuring and monitoring costs 
The total cost of a measuring and monitoring scheme in any given region can be calculated 
empirically as M=n*CN*F while the average measurement and monitoring cost per C-credit 




Sample size and measurement and monitoring costs per credit are calculated for three 
alternative scenarios by varying the measurement error,ε , and confidence level associated with 
the sampling scheme. Initially, measurement and monitoring costs per C credit are estimated for 
each sub-MLRA assuming an error of 10% (ε  = +/-10%) and 95% confidence (Z = 1.96) 
consistent with previous measurement and monitoring protocols (Boscola et al. 2000; Brown et 
al. 2000). In addition, the sensitivity of the sample size, n, and the measurement and monitoring    
 
cost per credit, MPQ, to changes in ε , Z are explored using two additional sampling schemes 
assuming and error of 5% and confidence level of 95% (ε  = +/- 5%, Z = 1.96) and an error of 
10% and a confidence level of 90% (ε  = +/-10%, Z = 2.576). These alternatives will 




C-credit price, population and sample size 
As the price offered per C credit increases, the population to be sampled in each area also 
increases following the expectations presented earlier, table 3. The population in sub-MLRA 52-
high increases from 158,524 hectares at a price of $10/credit to 496,153 hectares at a price of 
$100/credit. Each agroecozone follows the same pattern, with the proportional increase in 
population being in the range of 151% to over 300% as the price of C-credits increase from 
$10/credit to $100/credit, table 3.  
Using a sampling error of 10% and 95% confidence, sample sizes range between a low of 
599 in sub-MLRA 52-high corresponding to a C-credit price of $100 to a high of 3,146 in sub-
MLRA 58-high at a price of $10/credit, table 3. As the price of C-credits increase from $10 to 
$100 the sample size required for each agroecozone decreases between 10% and 30%. These 
results show that in this empirical example, as Z, ε , and  j σ ~ are held constant and the price per 
C-credit increases, the population to be sampled increases and the size of the sample decreases. 
If soil C variability and soil C changes within each agroecosystem were calculated at each price 
level, population and sample size might exhibit a different relationship.     
 
Sample size, error and confidence 
  A smaller error bound or higher degree of confidence increases the sample size required 
to statistically represent each area at every price level, table 3. A decrease in the allowable 
sample error from 10% to 5%, while keeping the confidence level at 95%, increases the total 
sample size approximately four fold. In contrast, an increase in confidence from 95% to 99%, 
holding the acceptable error at 10%, increases the sample size in all agroecozones at every price 
approximately 1.7 times. These results suggest that a small error bound and high confidence 
level will greatly increase the sampling burden and cost of measurement and monitoring per 
credit in all areas at every market price for C-credits. The appropriate error bound and 
confidence interval will depend in part on the value placed on C-credits. At higher market prices, 
the costs of under or over estimating the number of C-credits increase for producers and 
purchasers respectively, therefore in this situation, there are greater benefits from more accurate 
measurement and monitoring. 
 
Measuring and monitoring cost per credit 
  The average cost of measuring and monitoring each credit in each agroecozone can be 
estimated by multiplying the number of samples required, table 3, by the cost per sample and the 
frequency of sampling over the duration of the project and dividing by the total number of credits 
produced. Figure 3 plots the cost/credit of measuring and monitoring against the total number of 
credits produced at payments between $10 to $100/credit in each agroecozone over three error 
and confidence combinations. Measuring and monitoring costs range between a low of 1 cent per 
C-credit in sub-MLRA 52-high to 28 cents per C-credit in sub-MLRA 53a-low assuming a 10% 
error and 95% confidence interval, figure 3. In each sub-MLRA the measuring and monitoring    
 
costs per credit exhibit economies of scale. As the number of C-credits produced in a region 
increase the average measuring and monitoring cost per credit decreases. This is driven by two 
factors. First, as the price per C-credit increases, the sample size decreases (table 3) and second 
as the price per C-credit increases the number of C-credits produced also increases. A decrease in 
acceptable error or an increase in the desired confidence level increase the costs of measurement 
and monitoring in proportion with the sample size shown in table 3, i.e. if sample size increases 
by 4, the measurement and monitoring cost per credit also increases by 4 at any given payment 
level within an agroecozone. This result is driven by the fact that we have assumed that the cost 
of an individual sample remains constant and independent of the sample size. 
  Tables 4a, b and c, show that as a percentage of the total credit price, measuring and 
monitoring costs per credit range between 100
th of 1% to 10.6%. At 10% error and 95% 
confidence (consistent with several forestry projects) measurement costs do not exceed 3% of the 
credit purchase price.  
 
Spatial heterogeneity, sample size and measurement and monitoring costs 
Both sample size and measurement and monitoring costs per C-credit vary between each 
agroecozone at every price level, table 3 and figure 3. Regional differences in measuring and 
monitoring costs can be explained in part by the different degrees of spatial heterogeneity in 
rates of C sequestration exhibited by each area. The relative spatial heterogeneity of soil C 
changes in an agroecozone is represented by the coefficient of variation. Table 5 reports the 
sample size and spatial heterogeneity of an area. The data indicate that these two variables are 
positively related. Figure 4a demonstrates that the measuring and monitoring cost per C-credit is 
positively related to the degree of spatial heterogeneity within an area. At any given price,    
 
regions with greatest spatial heterogeneity are associated with the largest samples and the 
highest costs of measuring and monitoring per C-credit, supporting our earlier statement.  
  Figure 4a demonstrates that there are also other factors that influence the measuring and 
monitoring costs per C-credit. For example, sub-MLRAs 52-high and 53a-low exhibit the same 
spatial heterogeneity at several points but the measuring and monitoring costs per credit are 
higher in sub-MLRA 52-high over this range. Figure 4b demonstrates that measuring and 
monitoring costs per C-credit decline as the total number of credits produced within an area 
increase. Figures 4a and 4b suggest that the measurement and monitoring cost per C-credit is in 
part determined by the spatial heterogeneity of soil C rates within an area and the economic and 
biophysical resource endowments that govern producer participation and C-credit generation at 
each price level.  
    
Conclusions 
This paper develops a conceptual measurement and monitoring protocol for C-credits 
generated by increasing agricultural soil C under per-tonne contracts. An empirical example of 
this framework is implemented for the dry-land crop producing region of Montana and used to 
examine the factors that influence measuring and monitoring costs for soil C. We hypothesize 
that the sample size and measuring and monitoring costs per C-credit within a given region are 
influenced by the market price for C-credits and the spatial heterogeneity of C-credit 
accumulation. Results from the empirical application support these hypotheses and demonstrate 
that the measuring and monitoring costs per C-credit are inversely related to the price offered for 
each credit. In addition, at every price level for C-credits, the measuring and monitoring cost per 
credit is larger in regions that exhibit higher spatial heterogeneity. A decrease in the acceptable    
 
sampling error or an increase in the confidence level raise the costs of measuring and monitoring. 
The proportional increase in costs is larger for a decrease in the acceptable error.  
The results presented above have several implications for the costs of measuring and 
monitoring soil C-credits and the relative efficiency of a per-tonne contract design versus a per-
hectare contract design. First, the measuring and monitoring costs per C-credit could be a very 
small percentage of the value of the credit as reflected in the payment level. In this analysis the 
measuring and monitoring costs ranged between a maximum of 3% to 10.6% of total credit value 
(depending on the assumed error and confidence level). This suggests that in most cases the 
additional costs of a measuring and monitoring protocol for C-credits is unlikely to make a per 
tonne contract less efficient than the per hectare contract, unless the opportunity costs of 
supplying C-credits are very similar under both contract schemes. Previous work by Antle et al. 
(2002b) shows that the efficiency gain from a per-tonne contract over a per-hectare contract 
increases with the degree of spatial heterogeneity, in each region and although measuring and 
monitoring costs per C-credit are also positively related to spatial heterogeneity, they do not 
outweigh the efficiency gains. Regions with high heterogeneity are able to support higher 
measuring and monitoring costs as they have the greatest difference in the opportunity cost of 
supplying C-credits under each contract type.  
Second, the error and confidence level chosen for the sample design will be, in part, a 
function of the value of each C-credit. At high credit prices there are larger costs to over or under 
estimating the number of credits, thus more resources could be merited for measurement and 
monitoring. Third, the measurement and monitoring costs are influenced by the size of each 
contract region. Under the measuring and monitoring protocol, soil C accumulation rates are 
fixed over each region and are independent of the actual location and composition of the    
 
population supplying C-credits. When the population supplying C-credits is small (at low prices) 
estimated measuring and monitoring costs per C-credit could be larger than necessary because 
the variability of soil C rates could be overstated. This suggests that the optimal size of each 
contract area could be related to the price offered for C-credits. The general results from this 
study are likely to apply to other agricultural regions that are considering supplying C-credits and 
implementing a measuring and monitoring scheme. 
Extensions to the current work could provide additional insight into the optimal design of 
measuring and monitoring schemes for soil C-credits. For example, alternative sampling 
schemes could be considered as well as the implications of changing the spatial scale of analysis 
on measuring and monitoring costs. In addition the question of adjusting estimated C-variability 
to reflect the population at each price level merits further investigation. 
Several other issues that could influence contracting costs are not considered in this 
paper. In addition to C-sequestration, agricultural practices influence the emissions of other 
greenhouse gases. Ideally, efforts to mitigate greenhouse gases would require a full accounting 
framework that accounts for both changes in the net emissions of C (as discussed here) as well as 
nitrous oxide and other gases. These gases will also require monitoring, and this could further 
increase contracting costs. A second important issue not addressed in this paper relates to the 
transactions costs associated with assembling a large number of producers to jointly fill C-
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Figure 2. Agroecozones as represented by Sub-MLRAs
1 in Montana 
1MLRA= major land resource area. These areas were subdivided into high and low rainfall 











































































































































































































Sub-MLRA 52high  Sub-MLRA 52 low 
Sub-MLRA 53a high Sub-MLRA 53a low
Sub-MLRA 58 high Sub-MLRA 58 low
Figure 3.  Sub-MLRA sample cost per C credit – with varying error and confidence levels    
 
Figure 4a. Measurement and monitoring cost per credit and coefficient of variation in C. 
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Table 1. Data sources for sample size calculations at a given C credit price 
Variable 
Name    Value   Source 
Z  1.96 
(95% confidence) 
Normal tables 
ε   Varies by 
agroecozone 
Product of relative error (0.1) and the weighted average of 
estimated strata means. Estimated mean C changes were 
obtained from CENTURY model runs. 
N  Varies by 
agroecozone 
Number of hectares that enter into contracts to supply C 
credits at a given price within an agroecozone. Obtained 
from simulation model results. 
j Varies  by 
agroecozone 
Number of strata within an agroecozone. Obtained from 
simulation model results. 
Nj  Varies by 
agroecozone and 
stratum 
Number of hectares within stratum j. Obtained from 
simulation model results. 
j σ ~   Varies by 
agroecozone and 
stratum 
Estimated standard deviation of C changes within each 
strata and agroecozone. Calculated from input data to 
Century model. 
    
 




Value  Assumptions and/or Sources 
L  $232/day  Lead technician @ $17/hour over 8 hours = $136/day 
Driver/assistant @ $12/hour over 8 hours = $96/day 
R  $70/day  Lease value calculated from total equipment purchase price of  
$40,830, depreciated over seven years with 20% salvage value and 
15% before tax return on investment to lessor. 
FC  $16.50/day  Assuming a driving distance of 150 miles per day, fuel consumption 
of 15 miles per gallon and price of $1.65/gallon. 
ND  50/day  Developed from personal communication with Keith Paustian, 
Natural Resources Ecology Laboratory, Colorado State University; 
Brian McConkey, Swift Current Research Station, Agriculture 
Canada and Bernard Schaff, University Farm Manager, Montana 
State University. 
LC  $10/sample  Estimate provided by Keith Paustian, Natural Resources Ecology 
Laboratory, Colorado State University.    
 
Table 3. Population and total sample size ‘n’ by Sub-MLRA – with varying price per tonne, error and confidence 
 
Sub-MLRA 52-high  Sub-MLRA 52-low  Sub-MLRA 53-high  Price/C-
credit 
($) 
Population  % 10 = ε  
95% Confid. 
% 5 = ε
95% Confid. 
% 10 = ε
99% Confid. 
Population  % 10 = ε
95% Confid. 
% 5 = ε
95% Confid. 
% 10 = ε
99% Confid. 
Population  % 10 = ε
95% Confid. 
% 5 = ε
95% Confid. 
% 10 = ε  
99% Confid. 
10  158,524  861  3,377 1,476 283,708  1,884 7,381 3,236 108,137  785  3,067 1,346 
20  225,828  741  2,923 1,271 334,914  1,724 6,777 2,961 122,276  760  2,977 1,303 
30  277,276  683  2,699 1,175 388,611  1,630 6,426 2,803 131,647  735  2,888 1,264 
40  336,517  649  2,561 1,112 458,085  1,548 6,117 2,661 139,296  724  2,840 1,240 
50  372,671  626  2,477 1,073 494,068  1,515 5,991 2,605 148,722  714  2,806 1,225 
60  406,601  616  2,442 1,059 542,506  1,483 5,876 2,554 154,220  707  2,781 1,213 
70  443,312  609  2,410 1,043 577,104  1,429 5,667 2,461 158,933  702  2,763 1,206 
80  465,561  603  2,389 1,035 600,631  1,396 5,534 2,403 161,813  698  2,744 1,198 
90  485,585  600  2,378 1,029 624,158  1,399 5,542 2,406 163,384  697  2,739 1,195 
100  496,153  599  2,378 1,029 642,149  1,399 5,541 2,406 163,908  695  2,737 1,194 
 
Sub-MLRA 53-high  Sub-MLRA 58-low  Sub-MLRA 58-high  Price/C-
credit 
($) 
Population  % 10 = ε  
95% Confid. 
% 5 = ε
95% Confid. 
% 10 = ε
99% Confid. 
Population  % 10 = ε
95% Confid. 
% 5 = ε
95% Confid. 
% 10 = ε
99% Confid. 
Population  % 10 = ε
95% Confid. 
% 5 = ε
95% Confid. 
% 10 = ε  
99% Confid. 
10  154,526  3,146  11,849  5,351 214,256  997  3,919 1,711 189,820  1,307 5,109 2,239 
20  177,471  2,883  10,987  4,917 237,362  927  3,646 1,590 209,611  1,242 4,871 2,133 
30  197,905  2,703  10,372  4,619 271,843  864  3,412 1,486 232,890  1,199 4,711 2,062 
40  212,122  2,600  10,018  4,445 300,904  817  3,231 1,403 244,696  1,156 4,543 1,984 
50  233,194  2,499  9,671 4,277 312,982  790  3,122 1,358 254,592  1,152 4,528 1,977 
60  244,433  2,399  9,310 4,110 329,261  771  3,052 1,326 265,388  1,108 4,368 1,904 
70  258,949  2,366  9,202 4,057 338,189  756  2,984 1,295 277,083  1,086 4,282 1,865 
80  264,100  2,349  9,135 4,023 341,865  741  2,934 1,272 286,978  1,064 4,196 1,827 
90  269,250  2,322  9,043 3,982 345,016  736  2,915 1,265 288,778  1,048 4,134 1,801 
100  272,996  2,290  8,922 3,925 346,066  726  2,878 1,248 292,376  1,032 4,068 1,770    
 
Table 4a. Estimated cost of measurement and monitoring per credit – 10% error, 95% confidence 
 































(% of Price) 
10  0.046  0.463 0.077  0.774 0.077  0.765 0.281  2.808 0.036  0.356 0.075  0.749 
20  0.027  0.133 0.058  0.289 0.065  0.323 0.215  1.076 0.029  0.145 0.063  0.316 
30  0.019  0.064 0.046  0.154 0.057  0.190 0.175  0.584 0.023  0.077 0.054  0.181 
40  0.015  0.037 0.037  0.091 0.053  0.132 0.155  0.386 0.019  0.048 0.049  0.122 
50  0.013  0.025 0.033  0.066 0.049  0.097 0.133  0.266 0.018  0.036 0.047  0.094 
60  0.011  0.019 0.029  0.049 0.046  0.077 0.119  0.199 0.016  0.027 0.043  0.071 
70  0.010  0.015 0.026  0.037 0.045  0.064 0.111  0.158 0.015  0.022 0.040  0.057 
80  0.010  0.012 0.024  0.030 0.043  0.054 0.107  0.134 0.015  0.019 0.038  0.047 
90  0.009  0.010 0.023  0.026 0.043  0.048 0.104  0.115 0.015  0.016 0.037  0.041 
100 0.009  0.009 0.023  0.023 0.043  0.043 0.100  0.100 0.014  0.014 0.035  0.035 
 
 
Table 4b. Estimated cost of measurement and monitoring per credit – 5% error, 95% confidence 
 































(% of Price) 
10  0.181  1.815 0.303  3.031 0.299  2.990 1.057  10.574  0.140  1.399 0.293  2.927 
20  0.105  0.523 0.227  1.125 0.253  1.265 0.820  4.102 0.114  0.570 0.248  1.238 
30  0.076  0.254 0.182  0.606 0.224  0.748 0.672  2.241 0.091  0.304 0.213  0.709 
40  0.058  0.146 0.145  0.362 0.207  0.518 0.596  1.489 0.077  0.192 0.192  0.481 
50  0.050  0.101 0.131  0.261 0.192  0.383 0.515  1.030 0.070  0.141 0.185  0.370 
60  0.045  0.075 0.116  0.193 0.183  0.304 0.464  0.773 0.065  0.108 0.169  0.281 
70  0.041  0.058 0.103  0.147 0.176  0.251 0.431  0.615 0.061  0.087 0.158  0.226 
80  0.038  0.048 0.096  0.120 0.171  0.214 0.418  0.522 0.059  0.074 0.148  0.186 
90  0.037  0.041 0.096  0.103 0.169  0.188 0.404  0.449 0.058  0.064 0.144  0.161 
100 0.036  0.036 0.090  0.090 0.168  0.168 0.391  0.391 0.057  0.057 0.139  0.139 
MPQ=measurement and monitoring cost per tonne C.    
 
 
Table 4c. Estimated cost of measurement and monitoring per credit – 10% error, 90% confidence 
 































(% of Price) 
10  0.079  0.793 0.133  1.329 0.131  1.312 0.478  4.775 0.061  0.611 0.128  1.283 
20  0.045  0.227 0.099  0.496 0.111  0.554 0.367  1.836 0.050  0.249 0.108  0.542 
30  0.033  0.110 0.079  0.264 0.098  0.327 0.299  0.998 0.040  0.132 0.093  0.311 
40  0.025  0.063 0.063  0.157 0.091  0.226 0.264  0.661 0.033  0.083 0.084  0.210 
50  0.022  0.044 0.057  0.114 0.084  0.167 0.228  0.455 0.031  0.061 0.081  0.162 
60  0.020  0.033 0.050  0.084 0.080  0.133 0.205  0.341 0.028  0.047 0.073  0.122 
70  0.018  0.025 0.045  0.064 0.077  0.110 0.190  0.271 0.027  0.038 0.069  0.098 
80  0.017  0.021 0.042  0.052 0.075  0.093 0.184  0.230 0.026  0.032 0.065  0.081 
90  0.016  0.018 0.040  0.045 0.074  0.082 0.178  0.198 0.025  0.028 0.063  0.070 
100 0.015  0.015 0.039  0.039 0.073  0.073 0.172  0.172 0.025  0.025 0.061  0.061 
MPQ=measurement and monitoring cost per tonne C.   
 
Table 5. Coefficient of variation in C and sample size (10% error, 95% confidence) 
 
 
Sub-MLRA 52-high  Sub-MLRA 52-low  Sub-MLRA 53-high  Sub-MLRA 53-low  Sub-MLRA 58-high  Sub-MLRA 58-low  Price/credit 












10  1.49 861  2.22 1,884  1.43 785  2.89 3,146  1.61 997  1.84 1,307 
20  1.38 741  2.12 1,724  1.40 760  2.76 2,883  1.55 927  1.80 1,242 
30  1.33 683  2.06 1,630  1.38 735  2.66 2,703  1.49 864  1.76 1,199 
40  1.29 649  2.00 1,548  1.37 724  2.61 2,600  1.45 817  1.73 1,156 
50  1.27 626  1.98 1,515  1.36 714  2.56 2,499  1.43 790  1.73 1,152 
60  1.26 616  1.96 1,483  1.35 707  2.50 2,399  1.41 771  1.70 1,108 
70  1.25 609  1.92 1,429  1.35 702  2.49 2,366  1.40 756  1.68 1,086 
80  1.25 603  1.90 1,396  1.34 698  2.48 2,349  1.38 741  1.66 1,064 
90  1.24 600  1.90 1,399  1.34 697  2.46 2,322  1.38 736  1.65 1,048 
100  1.24 599  1.90 1,399  1.34 695  2.45 2,290  1.37 726  1.63 1,032 
 